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Friday, May 8, 2020 | History

4 edition of Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit samples) found in the catalog.

Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit samples)

Ariel Pakes

Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit samples)

by Ariel Pakes

  • 201 Want to read
  • 26 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Statics and dynamics (Social sciences),
  • Game theory.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementAriel Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky, Steve Berry.
    SeriesNBER working paper series ;, working paper 10506, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10506.
    ContributionsOstrovsky, Michael., National Bureau of Economic Research.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHB1
    The Physical Object
    FormatElectronic resource
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL3475735M
    LC Control Number2005615133

    Identification and Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Discrete Game Patrick Bajari,Victor Chernozhukov, Han Hong and Denis Nekipelov1 This version: April Abstr. Thomas F. Edgar (UT-Austin) RLS – Linear Models Virtual Control Book 12/06 The analytical solution for the minimum (least squares) estimate is pk, bk are functions of the number of samples This is the non-sequential form or non-recursive form 1 2 * 1 1 ˆ k k k i i i i i pk bk a x x y − − − = ∑ ∑ Simple Example (2) 4.

    Course Syllabus Industrial Organization Instructor: Sergey Lychagin and A. Pakes \A framework for dynamic analysis in IO," Hand-book of Industrial Organization, vol. 3 (). M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry, \Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games," RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (). Aguirregabiria V., and P. Mira. Berry, S. Ovstrovsky, M. and Pakes, A. Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Dynamic Discrete Games, Working Paper, Harvard University. Doraszelki, U. and Pakes, A., A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO, forthcoming Handbook of IO Volume 3. Hopenhayn, Hugo, Entry, Exit and Firm dynamics in Long-run Equilibrium, Econometrica (

    [2] Aguirregabiria, V. (): \Another Look at the Identi cation of Dynamic Discrete Decision Pro-cesses, with an Application to Retirement Behavior", Journal of Business and Economic Statist [3] Aguirregabiria, V., and P. Mira (): \Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games," Econo-metr Pakes, Ariel Michael Ostrovsky and Steve Berry, “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)” June Link. Doraszelski, Ulrich and Kenneth Judd, “Avoiding the Curse of Dimensionality in Dynamic Stochastic Games,” Harvard University, Link.


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Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit samples) by Ariel Pakes Download PDF EPUB FB2

We estimate parameters from data on discrete dynamic games, using entry/exit games to illustrate. Semiparametric first-stage estimates of entry and continuation values are computed from sample averages of the realized continuation values of entrants and incumbents.

Get this from a library. Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples). [Ariel Pakes; Michael Ostrovsky; Steven Berry; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry.

Get this from a library. Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games: with Entry/Exit Samples. [Ariel Pakes; Michael Ostrovsky; Steve Berry] -- This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry and exit.

Get this from a library. Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples). [Ariel Pakes; Michael Ostrovsky; Steven Berry; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steven Berry, "Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples)," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol.

38(2), pagesJune. Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX Document Object Identifier (DOI): /w Published: Pakes, Ariel, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games, with Entry/Exit Examples.

Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, Pakes A, Ostrovsky M, Berry S. Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry / Exit Examples). RAND Journal of Economics. ;38 (2)Cited by: Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples) Article (PDF Available) June with Reads How we measure 'reads'.

In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game. A dynamic discrete game is a generalization of a dynamic discrete choice model as in Rust (), Hotz and Miller (). As in these earlier papers, agents in the model are assumed to solve a dynamic programing problem.

Pakes, Ariel, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Berry. “Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples).” RAND Journal of Economics (): Aguirregabiria, Victor and Pedro Mira.

“Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games.” Econometrica (): Downloadable. We consider dynamic games that can have state variables that are partially observed, serially correlated, endogenous, and heterogeneous. We propose a Bayesian method that uses a particle filter to compute an unbiased estimate of the likelihood within a Metropolis chain.

Unbiasedness guarantees that the stationary density of the chain is the exact posterior, not an approximation. This paper investigates the asymptotic properties of a wide class of estimators of the structural parameters in a dynamic discrete choice game, i.e., a dynamic game with discrete actions.

In particular, we consider the class of K-stage policy iteration (PI) estimators, where K2N denotes the number of policy iterations employed in the estimation. Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples) Ariel Pakes* Michael Ostrovsky** and Steven Berry*** We estimate parameters from data on discrete dynamic games, using entry/exit games to illus trate.

Semiparametric first-stage estimates of entry and continuation values are computed from. the computational burden in the solution of dynamic discrete games and the in-determinacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria.

This paper studies these issues in the context of a class of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information and develops techniques for the estimation of struc-tural parameters. Estimating Market Power and Strategies - by Jeffrey M. Perloff June A Class of Estimators for Discrete (Markov) Decision Models.” Michael Ostrovsky, and Steve Berry.

“Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples).” NBER: Working Paper Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples) Ariel Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steve Berry NBER Working Paper No.

May JEL No. L10, C51 ABSTRACT This paper considers the problem of estimating the. Ariel Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky and Steven Berry, Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples), The RAND Journal of Economics, 38, 2, (), ().

Wiley Online Library. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES πi(ai,aj,s)= θ1 i s if ai =active, aj =not active; θ2 i s if ai =active, aj =active; 0 otherwise.

The parameters (θ1 1,θ 2 1,θ 1 2,θ 2 2)describe the profit of an active firm per unit of demand with monopoly profit exceeding duopoly profit, θ1 i >θ 2 i for i =1,2. The second element that we incorporate into the game is a pay-off shock εi. Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games, With Entry/Exit Examples Article in The RAND Journal of Economics 38(2) February with 41 Reads How we measure 'reads'.

We investigate the computational aspect of estimating discrete-choice games under incomplete information. In these games, multiple equilibria can exist.

Also, different values of structural parameters can result in different numbers of equilibria. Consequently, under maximum-likelihood estimation, the likelihood function is a discontinuous function of the structural parameters.By estimating the structural parameters that govern these games, we can recover valuable information about the participants™payo⁄s (and costs) and make predictions concerning outcomes that are not observed in the data.

Our focus here is on a particular subclass .Estimating Market Power and Strategies; Estimating Market Power and Strategies. A Class of Estimators for Discrete (Markov) Decision Models.” Michael Ostrovsky, and Steve Berry.

“Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with .